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Abstract
As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its
correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions
between social capital and government’s action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents
in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from
parent to child. The government’s role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is
exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both
setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we
include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results
obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of
sustained economic growth on social capital.
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1 Introduction
The use of the concept of social capital in Economics is a relatively new phenomenon. A unique definition
is still to come although researchers do highlight similar characteristics for the term (e.g. Paldam, 2000)1.
One of the fathers of this literature considers social capital to be “features of social organization, such as
∗I would like to acknowledge financial support from the Generalitat de Catalunya, grant number 2001 FI 00402. The
paper has benefitted from the constant help and suggestions of my supervisor Danilo Guaitoli. I would like to thank Jordi
Caballé, Andrés Erosa, Joan Maria Esteban and seminar participants at Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona.
1 Some papers (eg. Rodrik (1998) and Alesina and Drazen (1991)), though, make use of the same idea but baptise it
with a different name.
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trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating co-ordinated actions”
(Putnam 1993, p.167). Note however that as the concept is defined with respect to a group/society we
can think of examples such as the Sicilian Mafia where the interaction within the group has positive
effects for its members (mentioned in the definition) but not so for those not belonging to the particular
organization.
Social capital has been dealt with in the literature from a variety of perspectives. On one hand,
studying its determinants (e.g. Glaeser et al., 2000) and on the other, analyzing the effects of its existence
or level. Knack (1999) distinguishes, within the latter, two main channels through which social capital
might have economic results: a microeconomic and a macro-political channel. The first, developed in
papers such as Greif (1993) and Zak and Knack (2001), refers to its role as an imperfect substitute for
formal institutions and therefore, for example, for reducing transaction costs.
Our paper focuses on the macro-political channel which is referred to in the existing literature as
the way in which social capital can improve governmental performance and therefore, for some authors
(e.g. Knack and Keefer,1997) , growth performance. Social capital is added to the list of other variables:
electoral competitiveness, bureaucratic capacity, etc. (Boix and Posner, 1998), that explain the adequacy
of government functioning.
Evidence supports the existence of a correlation between social capital and good government perfor-
mance. Putnam (1993) analyzed this relationship for the case of Italy, finding that northern regions,
those where social capital level was highest of all the country, benefitted from the most effective provision
of public goods. Cross-country studies (La Porta et al. (1997) and Knack and Keefer (1997)) also sustain
the same hypothesis. The two most recent, to our knowledge, empirical contributions Knack (2000) and
King et al. (2002) test the relationship for the U.S. states. For example, the former finds a 0.43 simple
correlation between a social capital index constructed with interpersonal trust, census mail-in response
rates and volunteering, and a predictor of government performance elaborated by the Government Per-
formance Project. This result is robust to the incorporation of other determinants and comes through
even controlling for possible endogeneity problems.
A step further is to establish how the relationship comes about. Boix and Posner (1998)2 present
five “microlinkages”. The co-operation that results from a higher level of social capital enables a greater
accountability of what is being done in the public sphere and facilitates the transmission of voters de-
mands; preferences will tend to be more community-orientated; government policies and regulations will
be enforced more easily therefore reducing their costs; bureaucracy efficiency will increase as those who
are part of it also live within the same society; and agreements in the political sphere will be more easily
reached.
Except for the first two, the rest of the “microlinkages” point to how social capital enhances gov-
ernment’s productivity, what Putnam (2000) calls the “supply side of government”. We are interested
precisely in this aspect. As was already mentioned, Putnam (1993) presents a case study on this issue.
Narayan and Pritchett (1997) elaborate a detailed study on Tanzania’s income and social capital sit-
uation. Their results give a high quantitative magnitude to the impact of social capital on household
2Knack (2000) also describes some of these channels.
2
expenditure (their measure of income) and identify as one of the channels between the two, the better
publicly provided services.
The existing economic literature is mainly either fully empirical or consists of a dissertation over the
concept without formalization model. Some of the exceptions are Alesina and Drazen (1991)3, Bisin and
Guaitoli (2002) and Rodrik (1998) from a macro-political perspective and François and Zabojnik (2002),
Routledge and Von Amsberg (2002) and Zak and Knack (2001) from a micro perspective. They relate
social capital to diverse issues such as economic development, stabilization, modernization and growth.
Our paper presents a theoretical framework in which we study the interactions between social capital
and government expenditure through the provision of public goods.
Part of our work tries to shed some light on the debate on the crowding out effect of the size and
growth of the welfare state on the U.S. level of social capital. Putnam (2000) mentions this controversy
and takes a stand in favour of other explicatory variables for the decreasing trend in the American social
capital levels since the mid-sixties. He bases his argument on data of the evolution of government variables
such as its size or spending.
The study of the interactions between social capital and government performance is important. They
can have normative implications for developing countries which find themselves at a different stage in
the evolution of their social capital stocks and in their government configuration relative to developed
countries. If, as it is generally admitted, social capital is an asset for a country4, as well as good
governance, their optimal combination should be sought.
For the case of developed countries, we have mentioned how the U.S. has experienced a decrease in
this type of capital. If we agree that social capital has effects on other macroeconomic variables, the
study of potential explanatory factors of this trend is the first step to finding solutions to wider problems.
In the case of the European Union social capital research is not as advanced. The idea behind the
pioneering work on Italian regions by Putnam et al. (1993) has only been continued very recently for
other countries and not focussing exclusively on the interrelationship government-social capital (Putnam,
2003). There has also been an interest in establishing the effects of social capital on economic regional
growth (Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik, 2001). Social capital - government performance could be a new
direction for empirical work with, for example, implications in the allocation of the European structural
funds.
In summary, we are interested in the macro-political channel that links social capital with government
performance. More precisely, in how a more tight-knit society will enhance government’s efficiency in the
provision of public goods, an aspect which has been shown to be empirically important and which can
have relevant policy implications.
For this, our paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework.
As an intermediate step we solve for the equilibrium in the case of exogenous government expenditure.
This allows us next to present a more comprehensive model in which it is the government who takes the
3For Knack (2000) this paper is the only theoretical one within the macro-political branch. Worth noting that the
authors do not make explicit reference to the term “social capital”.
4At least in most of its manifestations.
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decision on its expenditure by taking into account voters’ preferences. The equilibria will be analyzed
in detail with the objective of determining the long run evolution of the economy and the relationship
between the private and public sphere. Briefly we also consider the possibility that productivity growth
could be explaining social capital dynamics.
Both for the case of exogenously given government expenditure and for the “voted” level, there exists
a steady state value for the aggregate social capital stock to which the economy converges in a monotonic
or oscillatory way. Uniqueness will also hold but with some additional conditions for the latter case. An
exogenously increasing government expenditure is eventually accompanied by a fall in the social capital
stock down to a certain positive value. When government expenditure is the solution to a policy problem,
utility functions are logarithmic and the public goods’ production function is Cobb Douglas, an increase
in the aggregate social capital stock leads to a higher government expenditure5.
The model has the following main assumptions that capture the intrinsic characteristics of social
capital:
a) social capital has a positive effect on government’s provision of public goods (which has been
thoroughly justified above).
b) social capital’s micro foundation. The agent will invest in social capital because she values per
se her child’s level of social capital tomorrow. Social capital, interpreted as norms, values and attitudes,
is transmitted from parent to child and accumulated through both the parent’s contribution and the
society’s impact.
c) externalities are present in this model yet the way they have been built in give some non-
standard results. When a parent makes the social capital investment decision, she knows she will benefit
from it by the direct effect it has on her child’s social capital next period (which enters the parent’s
utility function today). But our assumed form of family altruism (called by Bisin and Verdier (2000) “
imperfect empathy”) is a way of reflecting the externalities inherent to social capital. The private return
to this investment is lower than the social return because the individual contribution increases tomorrow’s
capital stock as well as the level that all future generations enjoy. If instead of just introducing tomorrow’s
individual level of social capital in today’s parent utility function, we had incorporated the welfare of her
child, as this is affected by the parent’s grandchildren and so on, the externality would be internalized.
Given the externality, what can the government do to internalize it? It could establish a subsidy to
the investment in order to raise it to its efficient societal level. But to finance the subsidy, taxes have
to be increased. Parents are being taxed to pay for an investment whose positive effects fall on future
generations only. In other words, their children would be willing to be taxed in order for their parents
to be subsidized. The problem is that our definition of a given generation has children living one period
and not working, thus, they cannot be taxed and parents being already dead when their descendents earn
labour income. Therefore, for this specific framework, dynamic externalities cannot be corrected with
intergenerational transfers. This implies that the government’s policy problem is also the first best for
the current generation.
In the next section, we develop our model, first, for an exogenously given government expenditure
5This result is valid for a wider range of economies. Details are presented in the section 2.2.
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and second, endogenously determining its level. In both cases we characterize the solution, define the
equilibrium and discuss the dynamics. Section 3 introduces productivity growth in the most simple
manner. Section 4 contains the concluding remarks and directions for future research.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical agents who live for two periods in an overlapping
generations setting. The representative agent is taken to be a child during the first period and a parent
in the second. During childhood no economic decisions are taken. The parent is endowed with a unit
of time. She decides how to divide it between working in the labour market at a given wage rate ω or
spending her time with her child in order to socialize her.
Preferences of all adult agents are given by
U(c, x, s0) = u(c) + π1v(x) + π2z(s0), (1)
where c is the consumption of the parent, x is the level of public goods provided by the government and
enjoyed by the parent and s0 is the social capital level her child will have next period when she becomes
a parent herself.6 The utility function U is additively separable. Each term, u(c), v(x) and z(s0), is
twice continuously differentiable and satisfies u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0, v0(x) > 0, v00(x) < 0, z0(s0) > 0 and
z00(s0) < 0. Moreover, the following Inada conditions hold: lim
c→0
u0(c) =∞, lim
c→∞
u0(c) = 0, lim
x→0
v0(x) =∞,
lim
x→∞
v0(x) = 0, lim
s0→0
z0(s0) =∞, lim
s0→∞
u0(s0) = 0. The weights π1 and π2 take strictly positive values.
Note that we are assuming an imperfect form of empathy as in among others Bisin and Verdier
(2000). A parent chooses to invest in her child’s level of social capital deriving utility from this. As we
are assuming paternalistic altruism, the evaluation of the child’s level of social capital is done through
the parent’s own preferences and not through those of her descendent. This form of altruism is supported
by numerous evidence presented in papers such as the above.
We want to focus on a particular aspect of social capital, that of norms, values and attitudes that
facilitate collective action. We leave aside for further work, network or trust issues also comprised in
the concept. It is intuitive to see that these particular aspects of social capital are to be built in part
as the result of the rational decisions made by the parent.7 This is known as “vertical transmission”.
Additionally, and as one of the characteristics which differentiates social capital from other forms of
capital, the child is as well influenced by the environment in which she grows up in (known as “oblique
socialization”).8 Following Bisin and Verdier (2000a,b,c, 2001) and justified by biology and sociology
literature, we assume a substitutability relationship between both influences. The higher the level of
social capital in the society, the less personal effort the parent needs to put in to achieve a certain
6For notational simplicity we do not include time indices but instead make use of prime to denote period t+1.
7The alternative approach, evolutionary mechanism models, is based on genetic transmission and focusses exclusively
on pecunary results. Yet for us when social capital is considered, fitness is not only important but also the behavioural
dispositions of the parent. This ch might even lead to the opposite results to the ones driven only by economic returns.
8 Social capital has also been modeled as an investment decision in a recent paper by Glaeser et al. (2002) but misses
the role played by the society in the determination of the individuals’ social capital.
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socialization threshold for her child.9 According to these guidelines (cf. Bisin and Guaitoli (2002)), social
capital accumulation is carried out in the following way:
s0 = µa+ (1− δ)S, (2)
where µ is the parameter that translates the time effort made by parents into “units” of social capital
(µ > 0) and δ is the linear depreciation rate (0 < δ < 1); a is the socialization decision made by the
parent and S the aggregate level of social capital present in the environment where the child grows up.
Therefore, the social capital level the child will be endowed with next period, s0, is a function of the
investment made by her parent today and of the current stock of aggregate social capital.
In this economy firms are identical and we assume they produce with the following constant returns
to scale technology:
y = Al, with A > 0, (3)
where l is the unique input, hours of work, A is total factor productivity and y is the resulting output.
The government produces public goods from which agents derive utility v(x). The level of public
goods in the economy is given by
x = x(g, S), (4)
where g is the expenditure borne by the public sector. The public goods’ production function satisfies
xg(g, S) > 0 and xS(g, S) > 0, where the subindexes denote the variable with respect to which the partial
derivative is taken. These properties are justified by the empirical work presented in the Introduction.
Government expenditure is financed through lump sum taxes.
2.1 Exogenous government expenditure
First, we consider the case for which government expenditure is exogenously given. In the following
section, its level is chosen by the government himself according to the preferences of the representative
agent which is the median voter.
Each of the agents in the economy solves its maximization problem. The representative firm chooses
her demand of hours of work l to maximize profits
Π = Al − ωl, (5)
where ω is the wage rate. At ω = A labour demand is infinitely elastic. The equilibrium units of labour
l are given by the representative agent’s problem for this wage rate.
The government supplies public goods whose level is given by g and S via its production function (4).
Revenue is raised with lump sum taxes. The government will balance its budget constraint every period
g = T. (6)
9Even for a more general formulation, results are still valid. See Appendix for details.
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The representative agent’s budget constraint is given by
c = (1− a)ω − T, (7)
where T are the lump sum taxes collected to finance the provision of public goods. Note that in our
formulation we are assuming social capital is built thanks to time spent by the parent socializing her
child since the transmission of values is considered a time consuming activity. The remaining time is
spent working, thus the opportunity cost of socialization is the parent’s foregone wage ω.10
Given S, g and T the representative agent chooses {c, a, s0} such that the following optimization
problem is solved:
Max {u(c) + π1v(x) + π2z(s0)},
subject to c = (1− a)ω − T, (7)
s0 = µa+ (1− δ)S, (2)
x = x(g, S), (4)
0 6 a 6 1, c > 0, s0 > 0.
Substituting the constraints and solving the problem with respect to a, gives the first order condition
π2µz0 [µa∗ + (1− δ)S] = u0 [(1− a∗)ω − T ]ω. (8)
The left hand side of equation (8) collects the marginal benefit which is decreasing in a. On the
contrary, the right hand side of the same equation that represents the marginal cost associated to the
investment problem, is increasing in a and goes to infinity as a tends to one. It follows that, this problem
has a unique solution a∗ ∈ [0, 1).
We are interested in how the investment choice in social capital a∗(T, S) is affected by changes in
the level of government expenditure, g, in the level of lump sum taxes, T , and in the stock of aggregate
social capital, S. Note how the first variable has no effect on the parent’s socialization decision but it
10Alternatively, investment in social capital could have costs in terms of goods, for instance, admission fees in a school
with certain behavioural rules. For this case, the consumer’s disposable income is split between consumption of private
goods and investment in social capital, therefore being the agent’s budget constraint
c+ a = ω − T. (7a)
We will work out the model for (7). In either case results would not change qualitatively (in fact with (7a) the derivation
would even be simpler).
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does on the level of public goods. The investment choice in social capital depends negatively on the rest
of variables. This can be seen by implicitly differentiating (8) with respect to T and S
da∗
dT
=
−u00 (c∗)ω
u00 (c∗)ω2 + π2z00 (s0∗)µ2
< 0,
da∗
dS
=
−π2µ(1− δ)z00 (s0∗)
u00 (c∗) + π2µ2z00 (s0∗)
< 0.
A higher tax burden reduces consumption and so the alternative use of income becomes relatively
more costly. For the case of a variation in S, a higher stock of aggregate social capital reduces the
incentives the parent has to increase its individual investment.
2.1.1 The equilibrium and its dynamics
Definition 1 Given the initial condition S0 and the exogenous sequences {gt}∞t=0 and {Tt}∞t=0 , an equi-
librium is a sequence of allocations {lt, xt, yt, ct, at, st+1}∞t=0 and price {ωt}∞t=0 such that for all periods
we have that
(i) given ωt, gt, Tt and St, the allocation {ct, at, st+1} solves the representative agent’s problem,
(ii) given ωt, the allocation {yt, lt} solves the representative firm’s problem,
(iii) given gt, the government balances its budget constraint, that is, gt = Tt,
(iv) yt = ct + gt,
(v) lt = 1− at,
(vi) st+1 = St+1.
In equilibrium the social capital formation function (2), rewritten to explicitly capture the role of the
state variable S and the exogenously given T , becomes
S0 = µa∗ (S, T ) + (1− δ)S. (9)
Proposition 1 There exists a locally asymptotically stable steady state.
Proof. The characterization of the solution a∗ (S, T ) allows us to prove existence, uniqueness and
asymptotic stability of the steady state. Taking into account the strictly positive value of the parent’s
investment in social capital given a zero-valued social capital stock (a∗ (0, T ) > 0), the evolution of
the aggregate stock of social capital always above the non-depreciated amount (S0 > (1− δ)S, for all
a∗(S, T )), the continuity of the social capital formation function in equilibrium (a∗(S, T ) is trivially
continuous) and its slope less than unity
³
dS0
dS = µ
∂a∗(S,T )
∂S + (1− δ) ≤ 1, for all S
´
it can be shown there
exists a unique intersection with the 45oline such that S0 = S = S∗. Asymptotic stability is guaranteed
by the latter condition.
Over time the economy converges to its steady state level. Convergence can be monotonic or oscillatory
depending on the slope around the steady state value S∗. For example, if the slope at S∗ is positive and S0
6 S∗ for all S 6 S∗, convergence is monotonic (see Figure 1); if instead the slope is negative, convergence
will be oscillatory.
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<Insert Figure 1>
Example 1 Let us solve our problem for the case that u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. The
representative agent’s choice is
a∗(T, S) =
π2
1 + π2
− π2
1 + π2
T
ω
− (1− δ)
µ(1 + π2)
S, (10)
and the evolution of the social capital stock is given by the following equation for which it is easy to
check we have monotonic convergence
S0 = µ
π2
1 + π2
(1− T
ω
) +
π2
1 + π2
(1− δ)S. (9’)
2.1.2 Dynamic effects of changes in government expenditure
As was mentioned in the Introduction, some researchers blame the expansion of the welfare state for the
observed decrease of the U.S. social capital stock since 1965. In fact, it is a widely supported hypothesis
across the whole political spectrum world wide regardless of having no empirical support (Putnam, 2003).
If we consider government expenditure as a measure of this greater intervention, we could analyze whether
this hypothesis is supported or not by our model.
The long run effects of changes in the tax level are described in the next Proposition which fol-
lows immediately from differentiating equation (9) evaluated at S = S0 = S∗ and making use of the
characterization of a∗(T, S).
Proposition 2 The steady state value of the aggregate social capital stock S∗ is decreasing in the tax
level T .
The short run effects of tax level changes on the aggregate social capital stock do not always coincide
with the long run effects. The following proposition characterizes the short run dynamics:
Proposition 3 Given a tax level T , for any aggregate social capital stock level below (above) the steady
state level, S < S∗ (S > S∗), next period’s aggregate social capital stock will be greater (smaller) than
today’s, S0 > S (S0 < S).
Proof. Consider an aggregate social capital stock level S such that for a given tax level T , it is below
(above) its steady state value denoted by S∗. Evaluating equation (2) for both stocks and proven the
magnitude and the sign of relationship between parent’s investment in social capital and its level (da
∗
dS ),
we can derive the following inequality:
S∗ = µa(S∗, T ) + (1− δ)S∗ > (<)µa(S, T ) + (1− δ)S = S0.
Therefore, S will be increasing (decreasing) over time.
The previous proposition tells us that the long run and short run behaviour of the aggregate social
capital stock need not be the same for all its levels . The phase diagram in Figure 2 illustrates this. The
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SS0 curve represents the points in the (S,T ) space such that the aggregate social capital stock remains
constant over time, that is, S0 = S. Wage rate ω is the upper bound that we impose on T .11 Thus,
for the problem in which government’s action is exogenously determined, an increasing trend in public
expenditure is eventually accompanied by a fall of the social capital stock.
<Insert Figure 2>
2.2 Endogenous government expenditure
In what follows we consider the case in which government expenditure is a choice variable. We first
analyze the consequences of this new setting for the problem of both the representative firm and agent
and then describe the new optimization problem for the government.
All but the government, solve the same problem as in the previous section. In the new set-up,
though,candidates for government choose the tax level that will maximize their chance of being elected
within a majoritarian voting model. Voters, the adult agents, share identical preferences so that if they
are single peaked, the median voter theorem holds. This implies that, it will be the representative agent’s
preferred policy the one that will be implemented by the incumbent government.
Given S, the government chooses {g, T} such that 0 ≤ T < ω solve the following problem:
Max {u(c) + π1v(x) + π2z(s0)},
subject to c = (1− a∗)ω − T, (7’)
s0 = µa∗ + (1− δ)S, (2’)
x = x(g, S), (4)
g = T, (6)
a∗ = a(T, S). (11)
In contrast to the original formulation, in this problem the amount of public goods provided x, is
determined within the model and the solution to the representative agent’s problem (11) is included as
a constraint. Public spending is financed exclusively through lump sum taxes.
Solving the maximization problem with respect to the tax level, T , after substituting the constraints,
gives the following first order condition:
π1v0[x(T ∗, S)]
∂x
∂T
= (1 + ω
∂a∗
∂T
)u0[(1− a∗)ω − T ∗]− π2z0[µa∗ + (1− δ)S]µ
∂a∗
∂T
. (12)
The next step is to determine whether effectively a solution T ∗ exists. It can only be guaranteed
assuming additional characteristics on the functional forms. This leads us to consider the following
example as the benchmark case for which we will carry out as detailed an analysis as possible and
thereafter extrapolate the results.
11This is necessary to guarantee a positive consumption.
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Example 1 (continued) The simplified endogenous government expenditure problem consists in max-
imizing {log(c)+π1 log(x)+π2 log(s0)} subject to all the above constraints (2’), (4), (6) and (7’) evaluated
at the a∗ (see (11)) from the representative agent’s problem. The first order condition is now12
π1
1
x(T ∗, S)
∂x
∂T
=
1
(1− π21+π2 +
π2
1+π2
T∗
ω +
(1−δ)
µ(1+π2)
S)ω − T ∗
(1− π2
1 + π2
) +
+π2µ(
π2
1 + π2
1
ω
)
1
µ( π21+π2 −
π2
1+π2
T∗
ω −
(1−δ)
µ(1+π2)
S) + (1− δ)S
. (13)
Despite the use of a particular functional form a closed-form solution for T ∗ is still unworkable.
Nevertheless we will check its effective existence qualitatively.
There is a well-defined solution whenever, as we saw for our exogenous government expenditure
problem, the marginal benefit is decreasing in the tax level T and the marginal cost is increasing in the
same variable. The latter condition always holds for the logarithmic utility case. An increasing marginal
cost is also the case for those functional forms that result in an effect of T on a independent of the
former’s level, that is ∂
2a
∂T2 = 0.
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As long as the production of public goods does not exhibit excessively strong increasing returns in
government expenditure g, the marginal benefit is decreasing. That is, we have two potentially opposed
forces at work on the marginal benefit: one on the marginal utility of the level of public goods x, and
the other, on the marginal productivity of the tax level T . The first is affecting negatively the marginal
benefit because the production of public goods is an increasing function of government’s expenditure/tax
revenue and the utility function v(x(g, S)) is concave. Note that this negative channel is independent of
the specific utility functional form assumed and depends rather on the assumptions on v0 and v00. What
matters in signing the second force is the characterization of the public goods’ production function. From
the start we have assumed that its partial derivatives with respect to both of its arguments were positive,
that is, ∂x∂g ,
∂x
∂S > 0. We now suppose as well how its second derivatives behave. If
∂2x
∂T2 6 0, the marginal
benefit function is decreasing in the tax level T . Otherwise, the final sign will depend on which effect
dominates: the marginal utility one or marginal productivity one.
A special case for which all the above reasoning is unnecessary is if we assume a Cobb Douglas public
goods production function x(g, S) = gαSβ. Figure 3 illustrates this example. With this specific multi-
plicative form the opposing forces just described cancel out so that there is no need to make additional
assumptions on the returns to government expenditure g.
<Insert Figure 3>
Proposition 4 Assume the public goods’ production function x(g, S) is Cobb Douglas and the utility
function components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. Then, there exists a solution to the maximiza-
tion problem, T ∗ ∈ (0,ω).
12No simplifications have been carried out to keep the intuition clear.
13Of course, even if the latter does not hold, a positive marginal cost is still possible under more detailed conditions.
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Proof. No explicit solution can be found yet existence can be proved by analyzing the first order
condition (13) for x(g, S) = gαSβ.Differentiating both the marginal cost and the marginal benefit with
respect to the tax level we have that the first is increasing and the latter is decreasing in T . The marginal
benefit is also a strictly convex function of the tax level and satisfies that lim
T→0
MB(T ) = ∞ and lim
T→∞
MB(T ) = 0, where MB(T ) = π1αT . The marginal cost is a strictly concave function of the tax level, its
value for the zero tax level is strictly positive and lim
T→ω
MC(T ) = ∆, where MC(T ) is the right hand side
of expression (13) and ∆ is a positive constant. The characterization of both functions guarantees the
existence of T ∗.
The solution to the endogenous government expenditure problem, that is, the level of lump sum taxes
that the government levies on the agent, has been discussed qualitatively. Next, we want to show the
effect of a change in the aggregate level of social capital S on this tax level T ∗.
Proposition 5 Assume the public goods’ production function x(g, S) is Cobb Douglas and the utility
function components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. Then, the chosen tax level T ∗ is increasing in
the aggregate social capital stock S.
Proof. Given the existence of T ∗, we implicitly differentiate the first order condition (13) for x(g, S) =
gαSβ with respect to both variables, S and T . The positive relationship follows.
In words, an increase in the aggregate stock of social capital S affects the chosen tax level T ∗ when
u, v, z are logarithmic and x(g, S) = gαSβ, α,β > 0 through three variables:
a) consumption c: the parent’s incentive to socialize her child is smaller because now the society’s
impact is greater. The parent will therefore dedicate more time to work increasing as a consequence her
consumption and thus reducing the marginal utility of consumption u0(c).
b) next period’s social capital s0: the indirect negative effect is through a and has already been
described in a). But there is also a direct positive effect via the non-depreciated aggregate social capital
stock (1− δ)S. The net effect on s0 is positive, thus its marginal utility z0(s0) falls.
c) level of public goods x: there is an increase of both the level of public goods and of the marginal
productivity of government expenditure. The resulting effect on the marginal benefit v0(x) is null.
The graphical analysis has been carried out already in Figure 3 above for the technology x(g, S) =
gαSβ , α,β > 0. An increase in the aggregate social capital stock leads to a fall in the marginal cost, that
is, a higher S implies a higher c and s0 and therefore lower marginal utilities. On the marginal benefit side
there are again two effects. Via the marginal utility of x, a negative one. Via the marginal productivity
of T, the net effect depends on the functional form assumed for x(g, S). In our case where both inputs
are complements, whatever the returns to scale, the two effects on the marginal benefit cancel out so that
this curve is not affected by the change in S. If we had instead considered a public goods technology in
which g and S were substitutes, for example, x(g, S) = f(g) + φ(S), the marginal benefit would fall with
S so that the final change in T ∗ would depend on the relative strength of the effects on each marginal
curve.
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Our result is even more general because so long as we effectively have a solution, the level of lump
sum taxes set by the government will increase with the level of aggregate social capital, for the case in
which the marginal utility force on the marginal benefit is dominated by the effect of the productivity
force or when both of these forces cancel out. Even if the marginal utility effect is stronger, the positive
relation will still be true if the change in S has a stronger net effect on the marginal cost than on the
marginal benefit. This can be shown by implicitly differentiating (13) with respect to S and then signing
the corresponding expressions.
The choice of the production function is largely a matter of reflecting what type of public goods
we are thinking about. For pure public goods it seems reasonable to believe that the civic sphere
has a complementary role to play. For those goods which are provided by the government but that
are excludable and/or rival, the substitutability assumption might be more reasonable. Although the
researchers that hypothesize a casual relationship between the continuous growth of the welfare state and
the decline in the social capital stock do not explicitly describe what type of production function they
are thinking of, this second possibility could be driving their results.
2.2.1 The equilibrium and its characterization
Definition 2 Given the initial condition S0, an equilibrium is a sequence of allocations {lt, xt, yt, ct, at, st+1, gt}∞t=0
and price {ωt}∞t=0 such that for all periods we have that
(i) given ωt, Tt and St, the allocation {ct, at, st+1} solves the representative agent’s problem,
(ii) the allocation {yt, lt} solves the representative firm’s problem and the labor market clears, i.e.
ωt = At and lt = 1− at,
(iii) given a∗t = a(Tt, St) from the representative agent’s problem, {gt, Tt} solves the government’s
problem,
(iv) yt = ct + gt,
(v) st+1 = St+1.
The implied dynamics of the aggregate stock of social capital is derived analogously to the exogenous
government expenditure problem. We work with the social capital formation function (2) and evaluate
it at the equilibrium lump sum tax level. For clarity, we write the state variable S explicitly,
S0 = µa∗ (S, T ∗(S)) + (1− δ)S (9”)
Proposition 6 Assume the public goods’ production function x(g, S) is Cobb Douglas, the utility function
components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic and A > 1. Then, there exists a locally asymptotically
stable steady state.
Proof. Once more existence is proved making use of the strictly positive value of the parent’s
investment in social capital given a zero-valued aggregate social capital stock (a∗(0, T ∗(0)) > 0) and
the continuity of the equilibrium social capital accumulation function, (9”).14 note though, that while
14Here continuity is not as straightforward as in Proposition 1 but it is still clear to see that a∗(S, T ∗(S)) behaves smoothly
under our standard assumptions on the utility functions.
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in the exogenous government expenditure the slope is always positive, when government expenditure is
endogenously determined, orbiting is ruled out at least if u, v, z and the public goods’ production function
take the particular functional forms assumed above and A ≥ 1. It can be checked with the following
equation that the latter are sufficient condition for the slope of the social capital accumulation function
to lie in the open interval (0, 1):
dS0
dS
= µ[
∂a
∂T
∂T
∂S
+
∂a
∂S
] + (1− δ). (14)
Asymptotic stability also holds under other functional forms and when A < 1, except in the special
case of the social capital formation function having a slope equal to minus one. More generally, those
economies in which the effect of an increase in the aggregate social capital stock is accompanied by a not
too acute rise in the tax level, have an asymptotically stable behaviour towards the steady state S∗.
For any of these cases convergence can either be monotonic or oscillatory. Its type depends on the slope
of (10’) around the steady state. The reasoning is analogous to the exogenous government expenditure
problem. Figure 4 represents the phase diagram for a case of oscillatory convergence.
<Insert Figure 4>
3 Productivity growth
So far we have considered an economy without growth. Yet, for the last 35 years, together with the
decrease in the stock of social capital and the increase of the Welfare State, the U.S. economy has
experienced sustained economic growth. If we are to believe the latter trend has had some effect on our
variable, an interesting extension of the model is to incorporate this feature. We do so in a simple extension
that maintains the basic features of our setting. Growth is modeled as the result of an exogenously
increasing productivity which translates into wage growth (ω = A).
3.1 Exogenous government expenditure
An increase in the wage rate ω has two effects of opposite direction on the decision to invest in social
capital a. On one hand, the opportunity cost of socializing the child rises so the parent would rather
work more hours instead. On the other, as social capital is a normal good, there is a positive income
effect by which her incentives to invest are higher. For the case of logarithmic utility functions, that is,
u(·) = v(·) = z(·) = log(·), the latter effect dominates the former. Thus, there is a positive relationship
between both variables.15
15This result is obtained by implicitly differentiating with respect to ω the first order condition of the exogenous govern-
ment expenditure problem (8) when u(c), v(x) and z(s0) logarithmic
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In order to establish how the social capital stock changes when the wage rate is growing over time we
study the dynamics of our problem. The long run effects of changes in the wage rate follow immediately
from working with the social capital formation function (10) evaluated at S = S0.
Proposition 7 Assume the utility function components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. Then, the
steady state value of the aggregate social capital stock S∗ is increasing in the wage rate ω.
Note that Proposition 5 relies on the relationship between the social capital investment a and the
wage rate ω. Therefore, the result can be generalized to all other utility functions for which the income
effect of a change in ω on the investment a dominates the substitution effect.
Proposition 8 Assume the utility function components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. Then, given
a wage rate ω, for any aggregate social capital stock level below (above) the steady state level, S < S∗
(S > S∗), next period’s aggregate social capital stock will be greater (smaller) than today’s, S0 > S
(S0 < S).
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 3 but in this case for a given wage rate ω.
The phase diagram of Figure 5 illustrates the above Propositions. The SS0 curve represents the points
in the (S,ω) space such that the social capital level remains constant over time, that is, S0 = S. Thus,
for the case in which government expenditure is exogenously determined and an increase in the wage rate
leads to a greater investment, productivity growth does not cause a persistent fall in the social capital
stock, even though, for some initial conditions, variable S may experience a decrease in the short run.
<Insert Figure 5>
If instead we assume that a parent will lower her socialization effort when its opportunity cost is
higher, it follows that the evolution of social capital will be the opposite of the one described above and
captures what has been observed for the past decades in the U.S. economy.
3.2 Endogenous government expenditure. Log and Cobb Douglas case
In order to obtain as unambiguous results as possible of the effect of productivity growth on social capital
behaviour over time, we carry out the analysis of the endogenous government expenditure problem for
the case in which the utility function has the form U(c, x, s0) = log(c) + π1 log(x) + π2 log(s0) and the
public goods’ production function x(g, S) = gαSβ. The first step is to determine the effect of an increase
in the wage rate ω on the chosen tax level T ∗.
da∗
dω
=
u0(c∗) + u00 (c∗) (1− a∗)ω
u00 (c∗)ω2 + π2z00 (s0∗)µ2
> 0 (15)
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Proposition 9 Assume the public goods’ production function x(g, S) is Cobb Douglas and the utility
function components u(c), v(x) and z(s0) are logarithmic. Then, the chosen tax level T ∗ is increasing in
the wage rate ω.
Proof. The assumptions on the utility function and on the public goods’ production function guar-
antee, see Proposition, the existence of a solution. Additionally, for these specific functional forms it can
be checked, by implicitly differentiating with respect to the wage rate and the tax level, the first order
condition of our problem (13), that there is a positive relationship between both variables.
The intuition is clear. A change in the wage rate ω has no effect on the marginal benefit of the tax level
as the inputs to the public goods’ production function are not directly affected by the agent’s income.
However, the marginal cost falls precisely because of our characterization of the utility function. That
is, when U(c, x, s0) = log(c) + π1 log(x) + π2 log(s0) the final effect on consumption and on tomorrow’s
social capital level is positive. Therefore, the net effect of an increase in the wage rate on the tax level is
positive (illustrated in Figure 6).
<Insert Figure 6>
Note that Proposition 9 is still true under less restrictive conditions on the functional forms u(c),
v(x), z(s0) and x(g, S). Recall from our discussion of the continuation of Example 1 that a solution
to the endogenous government expenditure problem is dependent on not excessively strong increasing
returns to government spending g in the public goods’ production function and on the marginal cost
being increasing. It follows that for certain specifications of a(T (S,ω), S,ω) and/or of the relative effects
on the marginal utilities u0(c) and z0(s0), we also have the result of an increase in the tax level T induced
by the rise in the wage rate ω.
Our final step to prove how the evolution of the social capital stock is affected by productivity growth
is to analyze the social capital formation function:
S0 = µa∗(T ∗(S,ω), S,ω) + (1− δ)S. (9”’)
Despite the use of specific functional forms for U(c, x, s0) and x(g, S), one cannot establish whether
the relationship between both variables S and g is positive or negative.16 For example, for the logarithmic
case it is straightforward to see that, as the investment in social capital made by the parent depends
negatively on the ratio T (ω,S)ω ,
17 the total effect of an increase in ω depends on whether the induced
increase in T is proportionally smaller or bigger.18 Thus, if the net impact of a rise in the wage rate on
the parent’s investment in social capital is positive, that is, the direct effect is greater than the indirect
16Analytically, the following cases come from studying the possible signs of the slope of the SS0 curve:
dω
dS
=
δ − µ
³
∂a
∂S +
∂a
∂T
∂T
∂S
´
∂a
∂ω +
∂a
∂T
∂T
∂ω
17 See equation (10).
18We may even have a more complex mixed case because ∂T∂ω may also vary with S.
16
effect through the higher chosen tax level, the long run and short run behaviour of the aggregate social
capital stock are equivalent to the exogenous government expenditure case (see Proposition 7 and 8).
If the opposite were to happen, the evolution of our variable S would coincide with the empirical data
already described. Figure 7 illustrates this latter possibility where the dynamics for non-steady states
(S,ω) are obtained as in, for instance, Proposition 3.
<Insert Figure 7>
Note that the above figure is also representing the dynamics of the social capital stock for the case of
a negative relationship between the wage rate and the investment when the tax level is affected positively
by a change in the stock.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a representative overlapping generations model of social capital and
provision of public goods. As a first step, government expenditure has been taken as given and, therefore,
the focus has been on the agent’s decision to socialize her child. Then, assuming this choice, government’s
expenditure has been endogeneized. In this way we have been able to study the interactions between
agents’ decisions (consumption, labor supply and investment in social capital) and government’s choices
(provision of public goods and tax levying).
For the first case it has been shown that the economy converges to a locally asymptotically stable
steady state. When we have introduced a growing government, that is, when government spending
increases over time, social capital on the contrary has fallen in the long run, although for some initial
conditions it has experience an initial rise.
In the endogenous government expenditure problem, the second case, commonly used functional forms,
that is, logarithmic utility functions and a Cobb Douglas production of public goods, have guaranteed,
with an additional technical condition, local asymptotic stability. Closed-form solutions have not been
available anymore, yet their characterization have given interesting results: complementarity between the
tax level and both the aggregate social capital stock and the wage rate.
Finally, in an attempt to understand the impact of sustained economic growth on the evolution of
social capital, we have introduced productivity growth. Under both cases the aggregate social capital
stock has increased over time. For some conditions in the endogenously determined tax level case, its
theoretical behaviour does mimic what has been observed during the last 35 years in the U.S.
Although the building blocks of the model have been simple, it is of great interest the introduction
of social capital. In this way we have incorporated a recent concept in Economics which has brought out
much empirical work and less theoretical formalization. Therefore, its scope is wide and this paper can
serve as a first approximation to the variety of topics it can be applied to.
For further work on the relationship public sector-social capital we can consider two extensions. First,
a quantitative and/or experimental approach can be an additional support to our hypothesis. The main
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problem with the former is the data availability. It has been collected from different sources but not always
in comparable measures. Knack (2000) is a recent example of possible improvements in the determination
of key variables in these type of studies for the U.S. and Beugelsdijk and Van Schaik (2001) for Europe.
From the experimental point of view only partial work has been developed so far and it would have to
be reinterpreted, if not rethought, to fit our model.
Second, we have considered an overlapping generations model with two-period lived agents which
take decisions only in their last period alive and are socialized exclusively during their childhood. As a
consequence of this structure and the dynamic character of the externalities, we could additionally defend
that our equilibrium solution was Pareto efficient. This result is interesting but too specific to the design
of the model. It might be worthwhile to look at how such a conclusion could or not be true under more
general conditions.
5 Appendix
All our analysis so far has been based on a particular social capital accumulation process given by (2).
This has been justified on evidence presented by sociologists and biologists (incorporated as well to
economic literature by, for example, Bisin and Verdier (2000a, 2001)). Alternatively, one could support
the existence of a different mechanism closer to the one studied in human capital literature. In this way
we would be highlighting the similarities between both forms of capital in detriment of the peculiarities,
already stated, of social capital.19 Nevertheless, let us consider how, if at all, our results are affected by
this new approach.20
Instead of assuming parent’s investment as substitute to society’s effect on the child’s socialization,
we could think that a greater complementarity between the two is best describing the transmission of
values to the young. The following social capital accumulation process captures this new trait:
s0 = BaγSθ + (1− δ)S, (16)
where B > 0 and the rest is defined as previously.21
Incorporating (16) to the exogenous government expenditure problem we obtain the first order con-
dition
π2z0
£
B(ea∗)γSθ + (1− δ)S¤Bγeaγ−1Sθ = u0 [(1− ea∗)ω − T ]ω. (17)
19 It might be tempting to consider both forms of capital as equivalent but the new concept of social capital has explanatory
power in itself. Schuller (2000) provides the framework to study the relationship between the two. In the comparison he
distinguishes four dimensions: the focus, the measures, the outcomes and the model. While human capital focuses on
individual agents, social capital centers on the relationships between them within a particular context. Of course, their
measures are also different. As well social capital’s impact goes from the effects on economic performance to those on social
cohesion while, generally, human capital’s outcomes are measured in terms of income or productivity. Finally, the linearity
of the human capital model is much less clear for social capital where ideally some sort of interactiveness should be included.
20Computational details are developed in an Appendix available from the author upon request.
21The social capital accumulation process used throughout the paper is a special case of this more general form, for γ = 1
and θ = 0.
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Note that we have a new multiplicative term which corresponds to the marginal product of the parent’s
investment, a. This “productivity effect” did not enter the original problem as a change in a had only a
level effect on tomorrow’s social capital s0. A solution to the new problem is guaranteed whenever the
parameter γ is less than or equal to one (γ ≤ 1). This way we are ruling out increasing returns to scale in
a. The same characterization as in the first problem holds for the new chosen investment level ea∗(S, T )
at least when the parameter θ is close to zero, that is, when complementarity is not too strong. For the
logarithmic case it is enough to take θ < 1 to guarantee ∂ea∗∂S < 0 and ∂ea∗∂T < 0.
A small enough θ ensures, as well, that the economy will evolve to a locally asymptotically stable
steady state. This is true despite the discontinuity of ea∗(S, T ) for S = 0 and the positive effect on the
marginal productivity of increases in the aggregate social capital stock. When we redo the dynamics for an
increasing government expenditure, the same results are obtained as in the original problem. Therefore,
under the above set of parameter values the economy’s long run behaviour for the exogenous government
expenditure case remains unchanged with respect to the case in which parents and society fulfill perfect
substitute roles.
When government expenditure is endogenously determined within the model the new interactions
between level and productivity effects make unambiguous results more difficult to obtain.22 We will
restrict our attention to the logarithmic utility and Cobb Douglas public goods’ production function
example. At least for this case there is a well-defined solution. Certain parameter values guarantee that
S will still increase when there is a positive variation in the tax level T . More specifically, whenever certain
properties on the cross derivatives of the solution of the agent’s problem ea∗(T ∗(S), S) are satisfied and
the net effect of an increase in the aggregate social capital stock on tomorrow’s social capital is negative
or intuitively, when the marginal benefit falls (note that for the Cobb Douglas case it will not shift) but
less than the marginal cost. The equilibrium analysis is still true if we assume the marginal productivity
effect is not too strong.
Finally, the introduction of this more general accumulation function does not give additional insights
into the role played by productivity growth in the evolution of social capital (at least for the case of
exogenously determined government expenditure).
Our initial results therefore, remain qualitatively identical for a larger set of parameter values. This
justifies further our use of the social capital accumulation function (2) where parental investment and
the society’s influence need not have any degree of complementarity.
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Figure 1: The Mapping S0 = µa∗(S, T ) + (1− δ)S. Monotonic Convergence Example
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Figure 4: The Mapping S0 = µa∗(S, T ∗(S)) + (1− δ)S. Oscillatory Convergence Example
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